

Territorial Cleavages and the Cypriot Constitutional Transition

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Cyprus and the Wider Context


- Cyprus is frequently compared to other conflict areas across a number of issues (e.g.; Kaufmann 2008; Diez et al. 2008; Ker-Lindsay 2012)
- Territorial partition in Cyprus is fairly new and highly contested, however, territorial readjustments might also catalyze a future compromise
- Broader lessons could be drawn from the decades of mediating power-sharing in the island and vice versa international experience could inform
Cyprus

The Cypriot Case

- The territorial dimension in four maps
- Major milestones (1960, 1963, 1974 & 2004)
- Conflicting narratives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots

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


GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

SURVEY OF
KYPROS - CYPRUS
ADMINISTRATION MAP
Distribution of Population by Ethnic Group - 1960

Kilometers 0 5 10 15 20 Kilometers




Distribution of Population by Ethnic Group 1960

LEGEND

- ⊕ Communities with Purely Greek Cypriot Population
- ⊕ Communities with Purely Turkish Cypriot Population
- ⊕ Mixed Communities where Greek Cypriot Population is Greater
- ⊕ Mixed Communities where Turkish Cypriot Population is Greater
- No Population Reported in 1960 Census
- District Boundary
- Sovereign State Area Boundary
- Village Boundary
- Positions of Turkish Invading Forces

Cyprus 1963-1974

MEDITERRANEAN SEA



CYPRUS
DISTRIBUTION OF THE
TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES
SEPTEMBER 1964

- Held by Turkish Cypriots
- Turkish Cypriot Communities
- Turkish Cypriot Communities of particular interest

0 10 20 30
MILES
0 10 20 30
KILOMETRES

The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

F642/11/1964

Cyprus 1974-

Mediterranean Sea

Rizokarpaso

Kyrenia

Turkish Cypriot-administered area

UN buffer zone

Morphou

NICOSIA

Famagusta

UN buffer zone

Strovolos

Mount Olympus

Area controlled by Cyprus Government
(Greek Cypriot area)

Larnaca

Dhekelia
Sovereign Base Area
(U.K.)

Mediterranean S


Polis

Paphos

Vasilikos


Limassol

Akrotiri
Sovereign Base Area
(U.K.)



TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENT

Cyprus 2004 Annan Plan Proposal



PHASES OF ADJUSTMENT

Phase	UN Enhanced Supervision	Entitled Constituent State
Phase 1	-	104 days
Phase 2	-	6 months
Phase 3	1 year	1½ years
Phase 4	2 years	2½ years
Phase 5	2½ years	3 years
Phase 6	2 years 8 months	3½ years

— Constituent state boundary
 // Sovereign Base Area (U.K.)

The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply a position of the United Kingdom in respect of any territory or its status.

The Land for Power-Sharing Linkage

- Territorial adjustments in favor of the Greek Cypriots will be combined with decentralized federalism and power-sharing at the center
- Improved power-sharing arrangements will also make territorial transfers more acceptable
- The February 2014 joint statement called for a 'bi-communal, bi-zonal federation' and 'separate simultaneous referenda'

Power-Sharing Arrangements

- Consociationalism (Lijphart, 2004; McGarry and O'Leary, 2009) v. Centripetalism (Horowitz, 2003) are seen in most accounts as hostile to each other
- A 'difficult marriage' or novel synthesis of the two?
 - Parties in the mediations have preferences towards either consociational or centripetalist arrangements
 - Past mediations have also included either presidential or parliamentary forms of power-sharing.
- Both durability and negotiability are critically important (McGarry and Loizides, in prep.)

Northern Irish Experience

- Short-lived experience of Sunningdale (1973-4)
- ‘..out of the blue there was a proposal that departments would be share around’ (McEvoy 2006)
- Membership in the executive is automatically determined by electoral strength rather than post-election negotiations (O’Leary et al. 2005; Loizides 2015)

Allocations under the d'Hondt


- Assume four parties A, B, C and D
- Seats A (34), B (32), C (15) and D (9)
- Divisor 1, 2, 3 (please see handout)

Modified Cypriot Version

(d'Hondt plus semi- presidentialism)

- Political parties will be entitled *automatically* cabinet positions on the basis of their seats in the Senate after each election
- A cross-voted presidency as agreed in 2009 will form an additional arbitration mechanism
- Executive power will lie with cabinet but the two co-presidents will maintain joint arbitration powers

Pie-Chart Illustration of D'Hondt in Cyprus



Advantages of the Proposal

- The formula is fair and inclusive to all political parties regardless of their national/ideological orientation
- It is more likely to be endorsed by everyone including hardliners in power.
- It eliminates two negative scenarios:
 - A single party running the country alone with a weak majority
 - A party which aims to be included to be permanently excluded from power
- It is functional by safeguarding decision making through a 'triple lock' (i.e. executive, joint presidency, and judiciary)

General Lessons

- Even seemingly unimportant institutional changes can have major effects on the negotiability and durability of peace
- Automaticity, inclusivity and proportionality could secure mutual and credible gains
- Modified d'Hondt style executives combined with semi-presidential arbitration mechanisms could facilitate constitutional transitions elsewhere for instance in Ukraine, Colombia and Lebanon