

Terrorists, Radicals and Activists: Distinguishing between Countering Violent Extremism and Preventing Extremist Violence, and why it matters

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Overview

- Puzzles: Ideas vs. Action
- Radicalization
- Research Agenda
- Models of Radicalization
- Policy Issues
- The Meta-Narrative of Global Jihad
- The Two-Pyramids Model of Radicalization
- Mechanisms of Radicalization
- Relating the Two Pyramids
- Efficacy and Efficiency Issues
- Human Rights Issues
- Counter-Narrative Issues

What is political radicalization?

- Change in beliefs, feelings, and actions toward increased support of one side of inter-group conflict
 - SDS to Weather Underground
 - U.S after 9/11
 - Tunisia after Mohamed Bouazizi
- What is that process? Methodological quandry: requires longitudinal analysis
- Yet, much existing work tries to reconstruct the process by looking only at its outcomes: those who have become radicalized
- The result is a large number of theories and mechanisms, with an absence of compelling empirical support

Radicalization

1. They engage in politically motivated violence (“terrorists”);
2. They engage in non-violent but illegal political actions such as financial support for terrorists (“radicals”); or
3. They engage in legal political actions such as protest meetings (“activists”).

Research Agenda

- How do individuals end up in one of the three radical action categories?
- Are there three different kinds of people who end up in these three different categories? Or are these “stages” along a “conveyor-belt” through which a given individual may pass?
- What are the drivers of the transitions involved? What motivates an individual to cross boundaries, either passing from non-radical to radical, or from radical to terrorist?
- What are the barriers to these transitions? Why do so few people become radicalized and is there anything special about these few?
- Do the categories of action, and the transitions between different categories, depend on the particular cause being espoused, or do all movements and issues exhibit commonalities in the structure of radicalization?

Strategic questions

Is it possible to tell which category of action an individual will move toward by examining an individual's attitudes?

More generally, can current attitudes predict the future political trajectory of an individual?

Methodological issues

- Interviews & Control Groups
- Selection bias & small- n
- Multivariate problem
 - Independent effects
 - Feedback loops
 - Causal mechanism
- Structural and personal factors
 - Political background (relative group deprivation)
 - psych make-up and personality characteristics (trauma and psychopathology)
 - Social circumstances for joining (identity conflicts)
- Pathways, drivers, barriers

Questions

- Is there a structure to the attitudes of “radicals”?
- What relationship emerges from that structure?
- What are the broader policy implications?

Models of Radicalization

Connections between radical beliefs and feelings (cognition & attitudes), and radicalization to violent action

Attitudes towards a conflict **VARY** within a population

1. but the relationship to violence is weak or indeterminate
2. but violence is conditioned by the cost (external and personality-based) of criminal action
3. and the variation is correlated (clusters) with the likelihood of radical action

Diffuse model: intensity or dissatisfaction as dangerous

Policy Issues


- Life dis/satisfaction vs. action
- Moral/religious vs. social/political
- Social/welfare remedies?
- Government policy?

Meta-Narrative of Global Jihad

- Idea: Islam is under attack
- Narrative: Jihadis as defenders
- Ideology: Defence of Islam is proportional, just, and sanctified
- Identity: Moral duty

Four narratives

- Political: hegemony & exploitation
- Moral: contradictions & moral decay
- Religious: double legitimacy
- Socio-psychological: in/out group



OPINION PYRAMID: THE WAR OF IDEAS


Complexity

Islam distinguishes:

- Legitimate authority (state)
- Group responsibility (religious authority)
- Individual obligation

A Two-Pyramids Model of Radialization

- Opportunity Cost:
 - Belief (Low) vs. Action (High)



Radicalization: Action Pyramid

Lone Actors/Lone Wolves

- Disconnected-disordered
- Caring-compelled

Individual-level mechanisms of radicalization

1. ***Personal grievance*** (Chechen Black Widows)
2. ***Group grievance*** “lone-wolf terrorists”
(Ted Kaczynski, Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar)
3. ***Slippery slope*** (“Jihadist Next Door” Omar Hammami)
4. ***Love*** (Red Army Fraction, Brigade Rosse)
5. ***Risk and Status*** (Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi)
6. ***Unfreezing*** (9/11 bombers)
(including ***Fear*** -- Colombia, Iraq, prison)

Group- and mass-level mechanisms of radicalization

- **Meso level**
 - 7 – group polarisation
 - 8 –group competition
 - 9 – extreme cohesion under isolation/threat
- **Mass level**
 - 10 – external threat
 - 11 – hate
 - 12 - martyrdom

Action Pyramid


Not a stage theory

How to move up the pyramid without traversing each level, without radical ideas?

Five of six individual-level mechanisms of radicalization do not involve ideology/religion

Sequencing: group - narrative





Relating the two pyramids:
Possible Distribution of Acceptance

Shift

- Tipping points?
- Critical mass of drivers?
- Quantum leaps?
- What might precipitate such leaps?

Efficacy and Efficiency Issues

- Bravado vs. Action
- Narrative vs. Action Radicals
- Plural pathways with no profile trajectory
- Self-rad, recruiters, family/friends, media/Internet...

Human Rights Issues: War of Ideas vs. War on Terror

- Pluralist Democracy: challenge from the margins
- (Extremist) Religion
- Freedom of Expression vs. criminal acts (eg. incitement)
- Courts: not motivation and intent


Counter-Narratives

- Free-rider problem
- Meta-narrative vs. Actual Behaviour
- How?
 - Raise costs associated with acting on beliefs
 - Mitigate mechanisms of rad that may cause some individuals to bear such costs

War of Ideas

- Priority to counter-narratives that target
 1. Individuals higher up in the pyramid
 2. Individuals prone to an upward trajectory in the pyramid.
- But: radicals and terrorists are difficult to reach and difficult to move
- So, bottom-up? Muslims vs. militants; Muslims vs. West
- Unintended consequences

Thank you and questions



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4 components of terrorism

- Group
- Ideology
- Social Support
- Individual members

The rad strategy

- Idea
- Narrative
- Ideology
- Identity

5 types of targets

- Losers
- Loners
- Helpers
- Adventurers
- Opportunists

3 categories

- Foreign fighting
- Radicalization/Incitement
- Terrorist activity

Collaborative Risk-Driven Intervention

- The Logic Model: Inputs, Activities, Outputs, Outcomes
- Acutely-Elevated Risk:
 - Significant interest at Stake
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 - Severe intensity of harm
 - Multi-disciplinary nature of elevated risk
- Filter Process
 - Must first exhaust all other means within its capacity and mandate
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- Collaborative Intervention: Information search, Communication, Service, Advise, Consult

Services mobilized

- Social services
- Social assistance
- Housing
- Mental health
- Sexual health
- Public health
- Medical health
- Harm reduction
- Counselling
- Cultural support
- Parenting support
- Home care
- Education support
- Employment support
- Addictions
- Life skills
- Victim Support
- Police
- Courts
- Corrections
- Probation
- Parole
- Legal support
- Fire protection

Risk-specific categories

- Neglect
- Unemployment
- Elder abuse
- Threat to public health and safety
- Sexual violence
- Social environment
- Poverty
- Supervision
- Gangs
- Housing
- Self-harm
- Physical Health
- Antisocial-Negative behaviour
- Emotional Violence
- Missing/Runaway
- Suicide
- Negative peers
- Crime victimization
- Drugs
- Missing school
- Physical violence
- Mental health
- Parenting
- Criminal involvement
- alcohol


Sample Companion Risks

Criminal Involvement

- Alcohol
- Drugs
- Parenting
- Mental Health Issues
- Missing School
- Physical Violent

Mental Health Issues

- Alcohol
- Criminal Involvement
- Parenting
- Drugs
- Missing School
- Physical Violence



Violent extremists

Conversations with individuals
family, and relatives

Groups and individuals at risk

Capacity-building front-line personnel
Institutionalisation and coordination
Advice on case-handling
Rehabilitation (and after-care)

General pre-conditions in society

Dialogue with civil society organisations and NGOs
Dialogue with radicalisation affected communities
Dialogue with key individuals

Exit

Individualised, curative intervention
Prevent recidivism. Psycho-social.

Capacity build.

Targeted, problem-oriented approach
Prevent risk behaviour

Outreach

Resource-oriented approach
Social capital and resilience
Prevent tensions and grievances

Select countries with Programs

- UK: PREVENT -- Al Furqan, Healthy Identities Intervention; Channel
- Denmark: Aarhus model (Deradicalization: Targeted Intervention)
- Netherlands
- Norway: Empowerment Conversations
- Belgium
- Sweden
- Germany
- Australia
- Singapore: “Three Rings”
- Saudi Arabia
- Indonesia

Differ in aims, structure, budget, and underlying philosophy

Opinions of the war on terrorism and experience of discrimination: Ottawa Muslims '08 vs. Pew U.S. Muslims '07

	Ottawa '08	U.S. '07
Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today? (% satisfied)	71	38
Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force in Afghanistan? (% right decision)	21	35
Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force against Iraq? (% right decision)	8	12
Do you think the U.S.-led war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism or don't you believe that? (% sincere)	14	26
<i>Now I am going to read a list of things that some Muslims and people of Middle Eastern descent in Canada (U.S.) have experienced. As I read each one, please tell me whether or not it has happened to you in the past twelve months.</i>		
Have people acted as if they are suspicious of you? (% yes)	15	26
Have you been called offensive names? (% yes)	14	15
Have you been singled out by law enforcement officers? (% yes)		5
And thinking more generally -- NOT just about the past 12 months -- have you ever been the victim of discrimination as a Muslim living in Canada (U.S.)? (% yes)	26	25
Note: Tabled percentages include <i>Don't know</i> and <i>No Response</i>		

Grievance and activism reports for Ottawa Muslims 2008

	Percent yes
Has the government of Canada done anything to help you personally or someone you care about? ^a	73
Has the government of Canada done anything to help a group or movement you care about? ^a	66
Has the government of Canada done anything to hurt you personally or someone you care about? ^a	9
Has the government of Canada done anything to hurt a group or movement you care about? ^a	13
<i>At this point I 'm going to ask about your experience being involved in the community. Please tell me how often in Canada have you ever joined in each of the following community or political activities. (percent yes)</i>	
Have you ever given money to a religious organization?	32
Not counting a religious organization, have you ever given money to any other organization concerned with political or social issues?	37
Have you ever joined in a protest march, rally, or demonstration?	22
Attended a meeting to talk about political or social concerns?	25
Invited someone to attend a meeting about political or social concerns?	15
Distributed information or advertisements supporting a political or social interest group?	13
Continued supporting an organization that fights against oppression even if the organization sometimes breaks the law?	5

^aPercentages total respondents giving ratings 4, 5, or 6 ratings on scale from 1 *not help(hurt)* to 6 *help(hurt) a lot*.

Note. Tabled percentages include *Don 't know* and *No response*.

Political attitudes of Ottawa Muslims

2008

Thinking generally, would you agree or disagree with the following statement:

All governments would be better if they were ruled under the Caliphate (% agree)

9

(38)

Please tell me how you feel about each of the following countries and organizations, using a 7 point scale where 7 means approve a lot and 1, disapprove a lot, what score would you give ..? ^a (% approve)

Al Qaeda

2

(26)

Hezbollah

12

(39)

Hamas

10

(42)

Muslim Brotherhood

19

(51)

The United Nations

45

(14)

The government of Israel

8

(31)

The government of the United States

18

(17)

The government of Russia

14

(42)

The government of Iran

13

(34)

The IRA, the Irish Republican Army

7

(66)

Tamil Tigers

2

(66)

The government of Canada

79

(5)

^a Tabled percentages combine responses of 5, 6, and 7 on 7-point approval scale.

Note. Percentage *Don't know* and *No Response* in parentheses.

There's been some discussion, especially in the last [2007] Ontario provincial election, about what the laws in our province and country should be with respect to religion. In your judgment, should Ontario laws...

	MUSLIMS	ARABS	IRANIANS	NON-OBSERVANT MUSLIMS	MOSQUE 1+ WEEK	STUDY GROUP MONTHLY +
Make no space for the practice of Sharia Law	22	15	33	40	15	16
Allow individual Muslims or Muslim families to choose to be ruled by Sharia courts in the case of divorce and other family matters if they want to	47	54	33	33	55	44
Require Muslims to be ruled by Sharia courts on family matters	8	8	9	4	9	9
Require Muslims to be ruled by Sharia courts on all matters	7	7	6	4	8	13
Don't know, refuse	17	16	18	19	14	19

Key Themes

- The Mute Dog That Barked—Correlations in support for Islamist terrorist groups with IRA and Tamil Tigers—and what FGs said about this
- The Loud Dog That Didn't Bark—Non-correlations between support for Islamist terrorist groups and antagonism to U.S. and Israel—and what FGs said about this

Key Themes

- Ethno-regional divisions in FG feedback
 - Montreal alienation from QC
 - Ottawa politicization
 - AB integration
 - Uyghur political integration irrespective of years in Canada and econo-cultural integration

Key Themes

- FGs explaining why supporters of Hamas, Hezbollah, Brotherhood also supported IRA and Tamil Tigers
- Two FG answers
 - Illogical and this cannot be vs.
 - It's "obvious," terrorist supporters are against any status quo

Key Themes

- FGs explaining why supporters of Hamas, Hezbollah, Brotherhood are not necessarily implacably hostile to Israel or U.S.
- Two FG answers
 - Illogical and this cannot be vs. It's "obvious," terrorist supporters are inflamed not just by Israel and the U.S.
 - As one of the strongest foes of Israel put it, jabbing his finger at the moderator, "you've got to understand that they hate corrupt Arab governments. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, you know, you know!"

Cameos from the Focus Groups


- Wars in the Ottawa groups
 - A Jordanian male on Israel is the problem vs. 2 Iranian males on why do you hate “our Jewish cousins”
 - Canadian-born young woman asserting that suicide bombing is the highest form of civilization vs two Lebanese born mothers complaining that Ottawa is soft on terrorism
- Polite conflict in a Calgary group—Canadian university graduate on U.S./Canada as racist/Islamophobic vs. devout Pakistani-born on Canada only country in world where Muslims can worship freely

Radicalization in Action and Opinion: Two Pyramids Model

The danger of focusing on

radicalization or violent extremism

is that it is easy to conflate action and opinion.



Radicalization: Action Pyramid

ACTION PYRAMID: THE CT WAR

Not a stage theory

How move up the pyramid without traversing each level, without radical ideas?

Five of six individual-level mechanisms of radicalization do not involve ideology/religion

- *FRICTION: How radicalization happens to them and us* McCauley & Moskalenko, Oxford, 2011
- 12 Mechanisms of radicalization from People's Will and modern terrorist case histories

Individual-level mechanisms of radicalization


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Ideology/religion as rationalization

- Humans don't kill other humans without a reason to tell self and others
- Religion/ideology is important as rationalization and appeal for mass support
- But alternative rationalizations easily available: ethnicity/nation, working class, reciprocity rule



**OPINION PYRAMID:
THE WAR OF IDEAS**

U.K Muslims sympathizing with terrorist framing of GWOT

*“President Bush and Tony Blair have said the war
against terrorism is not a war against Islam. Do
you agree or disagree?”*

ICM telephone poll 501 UK Muslims Nov 2004

Agree 14% **Disagree 80%** DK 6%

U.K Muslims justifying terrorist violence


“Do you think any further attacks by British suicide bombers in the UK are justified or unjustified?”

ICM telephone poll 500 UK Muslims Jul 2005 >7/7

Justified 5%

Unjustified 81%

DK/R 14%



Conclusion: Action vs Opinion Pyramids

- 99 percent of those with radical opinions never act
 - Many radical actors without prior radical opinions (slippery slope, love, fear, status)
- ⇒ Mass radicalization of opinion a different problem than radicalization to action
- ⇒ Deradicalization of opinion a different problem than desistence/disengagement
- Psychology of attitude and behavior same as war of ideas and war against terrorism

Two Questions

- ****RELATION OF TWO PYRAMIDS?** When does winning the war of ideas win the war against terrorism?
ASALA and EIG vs November 17 (1975-2002)
- **WAR OF IDEAS: TWO TARGETS?** U.S./West vs Hamas/AQ ?

4 components of terrorism

- Group
- Ideology
- Social Support
- Individual members

The rad strategy

- Idea
- Narrative
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- Identity

5 types of targets


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3 categories

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- Terrorist activity

Context for Contemporary Anti-terrorism Law

Craig Forcive
November 27, 2014



Collaborative Risk-Driven Intervention

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Risk-specific categories

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- Mental health
- Parenting
- Criminal involvement
- alcohol

Sample Companion Risks

Criminal Involvement

- Alcohol
- Drugs
- Parenting
- Mental Health Issues
- Missing School
- Physical Violent

Mental Health Issues

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- Criminal Involvement
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Issues

- Jurisdictions & inter-governmental issues
- Sub-hub or separate hub
- National agencies supporting local efforts
- Unfunded mandates
- Police-lead

Initiatives

- Anti-terror legislation
- C-44
- C-51
- Australian legislation?
- CVE/PVE: hub approach
- Canada's Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP)
- Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program

Thank you and questions



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Publications

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Overarching Methods: A Mixed Method Approach

- Homogeneity optimizing survey strategy to reduce geographic factors, thus Ottawa only quant.
- Heterogeneity maximizing focus group strategy to yield contextual meaning for survey data, thus
 - Groups in Montreal, Gatineau, Ottawa, Mississauga, and Calgary
 - Cross-sectional Muslim along with Uyghurs as control

Recruitment for Quant and Qual

- Random sampling in census areas with pops of >5% from Islamic countries
- Software eliminated common Anglo, Fr, Ital, Spanish names
- Two waves' of expert human review
- Non-reactive recruitment eliciting religion among other kinds of demographic information
- Landmark (eg. Chateau Laurier, Paliser) and familiar (e.g. Uyghur home), not FG facilities
- Single sex groups.

Quant (Survey): Approach and Value

Attribute	Value
Non-reactive recruitment (no identification of target audience, i.e. no “qualifier”)	Naturalistic setting for candid responses, no artificial sampling bias, no artificial response bias
Word flow and item content encourage permission to answer freely (e.g. use of 7 point scales, not just yes-no or word scales)	Naturalistic setting for candid responses. Excellent for non-extreme answers Multivariate analysis and causal patterns
Careful training of interviewers for the subject to produce to inadvertent feedback	Naturalistic setting for candid responses
Wide range of religious questions	No avoidance of potential drivers of substantive attitudes
Wide range of seemingly irrelevant measures, e.g. support for IRA and Tamil Tigers	Allows better understand through comparison
N=500 with small non-Muslim comparison	Almost all samples over 30-50 valid provided respect for MoE Same size and even larger than many pathbreaking election and other predictions

Quant (FG): Approach and Value

Attribute	Value
Regional divisions—QC vs NCR vs ON vs AB	Gauge regional effects that were purposely avoided in quant
Paired Uyghur vs non-Uyghur groups	Uyghurs—known for greater religious modernism—used as a control
Welcoming—landmarks (Chateau Laurier, Paliser), not focus group facilities	Better recruitment (NB appeal and opportunity for verification)
Naturalistic—no client observation or electronic devices; flexible script and agenda to achieve authenticity	Greater candidness
Culturally respectful—food, gender appropriate moderators	Greater relaxation
Eliciting interpretation of survey data	Pure value